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Abstract: This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg differential game
with mixed deterministic and stochastic controls. Here in the game, the follower is a random
controller which means that the follower can choose adapted random processes, while the leader
is a deterministic controller which means that the leader can choose only deterministic time
functions. An open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium solution is considered. First, an optimal control
process of the follower is obtained by maximum principle of controlled stochastic differential
equation (SDE), which is a linear functional of optimal state variable and control variable of
the leader, via a classical Riccati equation. Then an optimal control function of the leader is
got via a direct calculation of derivative of cost functional, by the solution to a system of mean-
field forward-backward stochastic differential equations (MF-FBSDEs). And it is represented
as a functional of expectation of optimal state variable, together with solutions to a two-point
boundary value problem of ordinary differential equation (ODE), by a system consisting of two
coupled Riccati equations. The solvability of this new system of Riccati equation is discussed.
Keywords: Stackelberg differential game, mixed deterministic and stochastic controls, linear-
quadratic control, feedback representation of optimal control, mean-field forward-backward
stochastic differential equation
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we use Rn to denote the Euclidean space of n-dimensional vectors, Rn×d to denote
the space of n× d matrices, Sn to denote the space of n× n symmetric matrices. For a matrix-
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valued function R : [0, T ]→ Sn, we denote by R > 0 that Rt is uniformly positive semi-definite
for any t ∈ [0, T ]. For a matrix-valued function R : [0, T ] → Sn, we denote by R ≫ 0 that Rt
is uniformly positive definite, i.e., there is a positive real number α such that Rt ≥ αI for any
t ∈ [0, T ]. 〈·, ·〉 and | · | are used to denote the scalar product and norm in some Euclidean space,
respectively. A⊤ appearing in the superscript of a matrix, denotes its transpose. trace[A] denotes
the trace of a square matrix A. fx, fxx denote the first- and second-order partial derivatives with
respect to x for a differentiable function f , respectively.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space, on which an Rd-valued standard Brownian
motion {Wt}t≥0 = {W
1
t ,W
2
t , · · · ,W
d
t }t≥0 is defined. {Ft}t≥0 is the natural filtration generated
by W (·) which is augmented by all P-null sets, and T > 0 is a fixed finite time duration. E
denotes the expectation with respect to the probability measure P.
We will use the following notations. L2FT (Ω;R
n) denotes the set of Rn-valued, FT -measurable
random vectors ξ with E
[
|ξ|2
]
< ∞, L2F (0, T ;R
n) denotes the set of Rn-valued, Ft-adapted
processes f on [0, T ] with E
[ ∫ T
0
|f(t)|2dt
]
<∞, L2F (0, T ;R
n×d) denotes the set of n× d-matrix-
valued, Ft-adapted processes Φ on [0, T ] with E
[ ∫ T
0
|Φ(t)|2dt = E
[ ∫ T
0
trace[Φ(t)⊤Φ(t)]dt
]
<∞,
and L2(0, T ;Rn) denotes the set of Rn-valued functions f on [0, T ] with
∫ T
0
|f(t)|2dt <∞.
We consider the state process xu,w : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rn satisfies a linear SDE{
dx
u,w
t =
(
Atx
u,w
t +B
1
t ut +B
2
twt
)
dt+
(
Ctx
u,w
t +D
1
t ut +D
2
twt
)
dWt, t ∈ [0, T ],
x
u,w
0
= x.
(1.1)
Here for simplicity, we denote
(
Ctx
u,w
t +D
1
t ut+D
2
twt
)
dWt =
d∑
j=1
(
C
j
t x
u,w
t +D
1j
t ut+D
2j
t wt
)
dW
j
t
with A,B1, B2, Cj,D1j and D2j being all bounded Borel measurable functions from [0, T ] to
R
n×n,Rn×k1 ,Rn×k2 ,Rn×n,Rn×k1 and Rn×k2 , respectively. Similar notations are used in the
rest of this paper. In the above, u : Ω × [0, T ] → Rk1 is the follower’s control process and
w : [0, T ]→ Rk2 is the leader’s control function. Let U1ad = L
2
F (0, T ;R
k1) and U2ad = L
2(0, T ;Rk2)
be the admissible control sets of the follower and the leader, respectively. That is to say, the
control process u of the follower is taken from U1ad and the control function w of the leader is
taken from U2ad.
For given initial value x ∈ Rn and (u,w) ∈ U1ad×U
2
ad, it is classical that there exists a unique
solution xu,w ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n) to (1.1). Thus, we could define the cost functionals of the players
as follows:
J1(x;u,w) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(〈
Q1tx
u,w
t , x
u,w
t
〉
+ 2
〈
S1t x
u,w
t , ut
〉
+
〈
R1tut, ut
〉)
dt+
〈
G1x
u,w
T , x
u,w
T
〉]
,
(1.2)
J2(x;u,w) =
1
2
E
[∫ T
0
(〈
Q2tx
u,w
t , x
u,w
t
〉
+ 2
〈
S2t x
u,w
t , wt
〉
+
〈
R2twt, wt
〉)
dt+
〈
G2x
u,w
T , x
u,w
T
〉]
,
(1.3)
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whereQ1, Q2, S1, S2, R1, R2 are bounded Borel measurable functions from [0, T ] to Sn,Sn,Rk1×n,
R
k2×n,Sk1 ,Sk2 , respectively, and Gi are Sn-valued matrices for i = 1, 2.
We formulate the Stackelberg game by two steps. In the first step, for any chosen w ∈ U2ad
and a fixed initial state x ∈ Rn, the follower would like to choose a u∗ ∈ U1ad such that J1(x;u
∗, w)
is the minimum of the cost functional J1(x;u,w) over U
1
ad. In a more rigorous way, the follower
wants to find a map α∗ : U2ad × [0, T ]→ U
1
ad, such that
J1(x;α
∗[w, x], w) = min
u∈U1
ad
J1(x;u,w), for all w ∈ U
2
ad. (1.4)
In the second step, knowing that the follower would take u∗ ≡ α∗[w, x0], the leader wishes
to choose some w∗ to minimize J2(x0;α
∗[w, x], w) over U2ad. That is to say, the leader wants to
find a control function w∗ such that
J2(x;α
∗[w∗, x], w∗) = min
w∈U2
ad
J2(x;α
∗[w, x], w). (1.5)
If (α∗[·], w∗) exists, we refer to it as an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium solution to the above
LQ Stackelberg differential game with mixed deterministic and stochastic controls. In this paper,
we will make a great effort to find a state feedback representation for the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium solution.
The Stackelberg differential game is also known as leader-follower differential game, which
attracts more and more research attention recently, since it has wide practical backgrounds,
especially in economics and finance. The earliest work about the game can be traced back to
Stackelberg [11], where the concept of Stackelberg equilibrium solution was defined for economic
markets when some firms have power of domination over others. Bagchi and Bas¸ar [1] discussed
an LQ stochastic Stackelberg differential game, where state and control variables do not enter
diffusion coefficient in state equation. Yong [16] considered an LQ Stackelberg differential game
in a rather general framework, with random coefficient, control dependent diffusion and weight
matrix for controls in cost functional being not necessarily nonnegative definite. Øksendal et al.
[8] obtained a maximum principle for Stackelberg differential game in the jump-diffusion case,
and applied the result to a newsvendor problem. Bensoussan et al. [2] investigated several infor-
mation structures for stochastic Stackelberg differential game, whereas diffusion coefficient does
not contain control variable. Shi et al. [9] introduced a new explanation for the asymmetric in-
formation feature of Stackelberg differential game, and an LQ stochastic Stackelberg differential
game with noisy observation was solved, where not all the diffusion coefficients contain control
variables. Shi et al. [10] studied an LQ stochastic Stackelberg differential game with asymmet-
ric information, where control variables enter both diffusion coefficients of state equation. Xu
and Zhang [14] and Xu et al. [13] addressed a Stackelberg differential game with time-delay.
Li and Yu [4] applied FBSDE with a multilevel self-similar domination-monotonicity structure,
to characterize the unique equilibrium of an LQ generalized Stackelberg game with hierarchy.
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Moon and Bas¸ar [7] investigated an LQ mean field Stackelberg differential game with adapted
open-loop information structure of the leader where there are only one leader but arbitrarily
large number of followers. See also Lin et al. [5], Wang et al. [12] for recent developments on
open-loop LQ Stackelberg game of mean-field type stochastic systems.
Recently, an interesting paper by Hu and Tang [3], considered a mixed deterministic and
random optimal control problem of linear stochastic system with quadratic cost functional, with
two controllers—one can choose only deterministic time functions which is called the deter-
ministic controller, while the other can choose adapted random processes which is called the
random controller. The optimal control is characterized via a system of fully coupled FBS-
DEs of mean-field type, whose solvability is proved by solutions to two (not coupled) Riccati
equations. Inspired by [3], here in this paper we consider an LQ Stackelberg differential game
with mixed deterministic and random controls, where the follower is a random controller and
the leader is a deterministic controller. In practical applications such as in Stackelberg’s type
financial market, some securities investor is the follower and the government who makes macro
policies is the leader. The novelty and contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• The game problem is new. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first paper to consider
the mixed deterministic and random controls in the study of Stackelberg games. So this
paper can be regarded as a continuation of [3], from control to game problems.
• The problem of the leader is related with a system of MF-FBSDEs, via a direct calculation
of derivative of cost functional. This interesting feature is different from [16].
• A feedback representation of optimal control function of the leader with respect to the
expectation of optimal state variable, is obtained by solutions to a system of two coupled
Riccati equations and a two-point value problem of ODEs. This is also different from [16],
where a dimensional-expansion technique is applied.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the game problem is solved in
two subsections. The problem of the follower is discussed in Subsection 2.1, and that of the
leader is studied in Subsection 2.2. First, an optimal control process of the follower is obtained
by maximum principle of controlled SDE, which is a linear functional of optimal state variable
and control variable of the leader, via a classical Riccati equation. Then an optimal control
function of the leader is got via a direct calculation of derivative of cost functional, via the
solution to a system of MF-FBSDEs. And it is represented as a functional of expectation of
optimal state variable, together with solutions to a two-point boundary value problem of ODEs,
by a system consisting of two coupled Riccati equations. The solvability of this new system of
Riccati equation is discussed. Finally, Section 3 gives some concluding remarks.
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2 Main Result
We split this section into two subsections, to deal with the problems of the follower and the
leader, respectively.
2.1 Problem of the Follower
For given control function w ∈ U1ad, assume that u
∗ is an optimal control process of the follower
and the corresponding optimal state is xu
∗,w. Define the Hamiltonian function H1 : [0, T ]×R
n×
Rk1 ×Rk2 × Rn ×Rn×d → R of the follower as
H1
(
t, x, u,w, q, k
)
= 〈q,Ax+B1u+B2w〉+ 〈k,Cx+D1u+D2w〉
−
1
2
〈Q1x, x〉 − 〈S1x, u〉 −
1
2
〈R1u, u〉.
(2.1)
By the maximum principle (see, e.g., Chapter 6 of Yong and Zhou [17]), there exists a unique pair
of processes (q, k ≡ (k1, k2, · · · , kd)) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n) × (L2F (0, T ;R
n))d satisfying the backward
SDE (BSDE){
−dqt =
[
A⊤t qt + C
⊤
t kt − (S
1
t )
⊤ut −Q
1
tx
u∗,w
t
]
dt− ktdWt, t ∈ [0, T ],
qT =−G
1x
u∗,w
T ,
(2.2)
and the optimality condition holds true
0 = R1tu
∗
t + S
1
t x
u∗,w
t − (B
1
t )
⊤qt − (D
1
t )
⊤kt, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.3)
We wish to obtain a state feedback representation of u∗. Noticing the terminal condition of
(2.2) and the appearance of the control function w, we set
qt = −Ptx
u∗,w
t − ϕt, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.4)
for some differentiable function P and ϕ from [0, T ] to Sn and Rn, respectively, satisfying PT =
G1 and ϕT = 0.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (2.4), we have
−dqt =
(
P˙tx
u∗,w
t + PtAtx
u∗,w
t + ϕ˙t + PtB
1
t u
∗
t + PtB
2
twt
)
dt
+ Pt
(
Ctx
u∗,w
t +D
1
t u
∗
t +D
2
twt
)
dWt.
(2.5)
Comparing the dWt term in (2.5) with that in (2.2), we arrive at
kt = −Pt
(
Ctx
u∗,w
t +D
1
t u
∗
t +D
2
twt
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.6)
Plugging (2.4) and (2.6) into optimality condition (2.3), and supposing that
(A2.1) R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t is convertible, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
5
we immediately arrive at
u∗t = −
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1{[
(B1t )
⊤Pt + (D
1
t )
⊤PtCt + S
1
t
]
xu
∗w
t
+ (D1t )
⊤PtD
2
twt + (B
1
t )
⊤ϕt
}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
(2.7)
Comparing the dt term in (2.5) with that in (2.2), noting (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7), we can obtain
that if 
P˙t +A
⊤
t Pt + PtAt + C
⊤
t PtCt +Q
1
t −
[
PtB
1
t + C
⊤
t PtD
1
t + (S
1
t )
⊤
]
×
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1[
(B1t )
⊤Pt + (D
1
t )
⊤PtCt + S
1
t
]
= 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
PT = G1,
(2.8)
admits a unique differentiable solution P ∈ Sn, then
ϕ˙t +
[
A⊤t − (PtB
1
t +C
⊤
t PtD
1
t + (S
1
t )
⊤)
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1
(B1t )
⊤
]
ϕt
+
[
PtB
2
t + C
⊤
t PtD
2
t −
(
PtB
1
t + C
⊤
t PtD
1
t + (S
1
t )
⊤
)
×
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1
(D1t )
⊤PtD
2
t
]
wt = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
ϕT = 0.
(2.9)
For the solvability of Riccati equation (2.8), in the following standard assumption that
(A2.2) R1 ≫ 0, G1 > 0, Q1 − S1(R1)−1(S1)⊤ > 0,
(2.8) admits a unique differentiable solution P > 0 by Theorem 7.2, Chapter 6 of [17]. For given
w ∈ U2ad, the solvability of ODE (2.9) is obvious.
Under (A2.2), the map u 7→ J1(x;u,w) is uniformly convex, thus (2.7) is also sufficient for
(u∗, xu
∗,w) being a unique optimal pair of the follower.
Now, inserting (2.7) into the state equation of (1.1), we have
dx
u∗,w
t =
{[
At −B
1
t
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1(
(B1t )
⊤Pt + (D
1
t )
⊤PtCt
)
+ S1t
]
x
u∗,w
t
+
[
B2t −B
1
t
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1
(D1t )
⊤PtD
2
t
]
wt
−B1t
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1
(B1t )
⊤ϕt
}
dt
+
{[
Ct −D
1
t
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1(
(B1t )
⊤Pt + (D
1
t )
⊤PtCt
)
+ S1t
]
x
u∗,w
t
+
[
D2t −D
1
t
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1
(D1t )
⊤PtD
2
t
]
wt
−D1t
(
R1t + (D
1
t )
⊤PtD
1
t
)−1
(B1t )
⊤ϕt
}
dWt, t ∈ [0, T ],
x
u∗,w
0
= x,
(2.10)
which admits a unique solution xu
∗,w ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n), for given w ∈ U2ad.
Moreover, we have the result.
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Theorem 2.1 Let (A2.1), (A2.2) hold, P > 0 satisfy (2.8). For chosen control function
w ∈ U2ad of the leader, there is a unique optimal control process u
∗ ∈ U1ad of the follower, whose
state feedback representation is given by (2.7), where xu
∗,w ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n) is the optimal state
satisfying (2.10) and the differential function ϕ satisfy (2.9). The optimal value is given by
J1(x;u
∗, w) =
1
2
〈P0x, x〉+ 〈ϕ0, x〉+
∫ T
0
(〈
(B2t )
⊤ϕt, wt
〉
+
〈
(D2t )
⊤PtD
2
twt, wt
〉
−
∣∣(R1t + (D1t )⊤PtD1t )− 12 [(B2t )⊤ϕt + (D2t )⊤PtD2twt]∣∣2)dt. (2.11)
Proof. We only need to prove (2.11). However, it can be easily obtained by applying Itoˆ’s
formula to 〈Pxu
∗,w, xu
∗,w〉 + 〈ϕ, xu
∗,w〉, together with the completion of squares technique. We
omit the detail.
The results in this subsection is a special case of those in Section 2 of Yong [16], but with
the cross term. We display those here with some refined derivation for the self-integrity of this
paper.
2.2 Problem of the Leader
Since the leader knows that the follower will take his optimal control process u∗ ∈ U1ad by (2.7),
the state equation of the leader now writes
dxwt =
(
A˜tx
w
t + B˜
1
t ϕt + B˜
2
twt
)
dt+
(
C˜tx
w
t + D˜
1
tϕt + D˜
2
twt
)
dWt,
dϕt = −(A˜
⊤
t ϕt + Γtwt)dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
xw0 = x, ϕT = 0,
(2.12)
where we have denoted xw ≡ xu
∗,w and
R˜1 := R˜1(P ) := R1 + (D1)⊤PD1,
A˜ := A˜(P ) := A−B1(R˜1)−1
[
(B1)⊤P + (D1)⊤PC + S1
]
,
B˜1 := B˜1(P ) := −B1(R˜1)−1(B1)⊤,
B˜2 := B˜2(P ) := B2 −B1(R˜1)−1(D1)⊤PD2,
C˜ := C˜(P ) := C −D1(R˜1)−1
[
(B1)⊤P + (D1)⊤PC + S1
]
,
D˜1 := B˜1(P ) := −D1(R˜1)−1(B1)⊤,
D˜2 := D˜2(P ) := D2 −D1(R˜1)−1(D1)⊤PD2,
Γ := Γ(P ) := PB2 + C⊤PD2 −
[
PB1 + C⊤PD1 + (S1)⊤
]
(R˜1)−1(D1)⊤PD2.
The problem of the leader is to choose an optimal control function w∗ ∈ U2ad such that
J2(x;u∗, w∗) = min
w∈U2
ad
J2(x;u
∗, w).
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We first have the following result.
Theorem 2.2 Suppose that w∗ is an optimal control function of the leader, and the corre-
sponding optimal state is x∗ ≡ xw
∗
together with ϕ∗ being solution to (2.12). Then we have
0 = R2tw
∗
t +
(
B˜2t
)⊤
Eyt +
(
D˜2t
)⊤
Ezt + S
2
t Ex
∗
t + Γ
⊤
t Ept, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.13)
where the triple of processes (y, z, p) ∈ Rn × Rn×d × Rn satisfy the FBSDE
dpt =
[
A˜⊤t pt + (B˜
1
t )
⊤yt + (D˜
1
t )
⊤zt
]
dt,
−dyt =
[
A˜⊤t yt + C˜
⊤
t zt + (S
2
t )
⊤w∗t +Q
2
tx
∗
t
]
dt− ztdWt, t ∈ [0, T ],
p0 = 0, yT = G
2x∗T .
(2.14)
Moreover, if we assume that
(A2.3) G2 > 0, Q2 − S2(R2)−1(S2)⊤ > 0, R2 ≫ 0,
then the above optimality condition becomes sufficient for the unique existence of the optimal
control function w∗ of the leader.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let x ≡ 0, and set the perturbed optimal control function
w∗ + λw for λ > 0 sufficiently small, with w ∈ Rk2 . Then it is easy to see from the linearity of
(2.12), that the solution to (2.12) is x∗ + λxw. We first have
J˜(λ) := J2(0;u
∗, w∗ + λw)
=
1
2
E
∫ T
0
[〈
Q2t (x
∗
t + λx
w
t ), x
∗
t + λx
w
t
〉
+ 2
〈
S2t (x
∗
t + λx
w
t ), w
∗
t + λwt
〉
+
〈
R2t (w
∗
t + λwt), w
∗
t + λwt
〉]
dt+
1
2
E
〈
G2(x∗T + λx
w
T ), x
∗
T + λx
w
T
〉
.
Hence
0 =
∂J˜(λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
= E
∫ T
0
[〈
Q2tx
∗
t , x
w
t
〉
+
〈
S2t x
∗
t , wt
〉
+
〈
S2t x
w
t , w
∗
t
〉
+
〈
R2tw
∗
t , wt
〉]
dt+ E
〈
G2x∗T , x
w
T
〉
.
Let the triple (p, y, z) satisfy (2.14). Then we have
0 = E
∫ T
0
[
〈Q2tx
∗
t , x
w
t 〉+
〈
S2t x
∗
t , wt
〉
+
〈
S2t x
w
t , w
∗
t
〉
+ 〈R2tw
∗
t , wt〉
]
dt+ E〈yT , x
w
T 〉.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈xwt , yt〉 − 〈ϕt, pt〉, noticing (2.12) and (2.14), we derive
0 = E
∫ T
0
〈
R2tw
∗
t +
(
B˜2t
)⊤
yt +
(
D˜2t
)⊤
zt + S
2
t x
∗
t + Γ
⊤
t pt, wt
〉
dt
=
∫ T
0
〈
R2tw
∗
t +
(
B˜2t
)⊤
Eyt +
(
D˜2t
)⊤
Ezt + S
2
t Ex
∗
t + Γ
⊤
t Ept, wt
〉
dt.
This implies (2.13). Further, if (A2.3) holds, then the functional w → J2(x;u
∗, w) is uniformly
convex. Thus the necessary condition becomes sufficient for the unique existence of w∗. See the
remark of Theorem 2.2 in Yong [16] for more details. The proof is complete.
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Next, putting (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14) together, corresponding with the optimal triple
(w∗, x∗, ϕ∗), we get
dx∗t =
(
A˜tx
∗
t + B˜
1
t ϕ
∗
t + B˜
2
tw
∗
t
)
dt+
(
C˜tx
∗
t + D˜
1
tϕ
∗
t + D˜
2
tw
∗
t
)
dWt,
dϕ∗t = −(A˜
⊤
t ϕ
∗
t + Γtw
∗
t )dt,
dpt =
[
A˜⊤t pt + (B˜
1
t )
⊤yt + (D˜
1
t )
⊤zt
]
dt,
−dyt =
[
A˜⊤t yt + C˜
⊤
t zt + (S
2
t )
⊤w∗t +Q
2
tx
∗
t
]
dt− ztdWt,
x∗
0
= x, ϕ∗T = 0, p0 = 0, yT = G
2x∗T ,
0 = R2tw
∗
t +
(
B˜2t
)⊤
Eyt +
(
D˜2t
)⊤
Ezt + S
2
t Ex
∗
t + Γ
⊤
t Ept, t ∈ [0, T ],
(2.15)
which is a system of coupled MF-FBSDEs. Note that it is different from that in Yong [16]. We
need to decouple (2.15), and to study the solvability of it via some Riccati equations. For this
target, for the optimal control function w∗ of (2.13), we expect a state feedback representation
of the form
yt = P
1
t x
∗
t + P
2
t (x
∗
t − Ex
∗
t ) + φt, (2.16)
for some differentiable functions P 1, P 2 and φ from [0, T ] to Sn,Rn×n and Rn, respectively,
satisfying P 1T = G
2, P 2T = 0 and φT = 0.
Noticing that {
dEx∗t =
(
A˜tEx
∗
t + B˜
1
t ϕ
∗
t + B˜
2
tw
∗
t
)
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
Ex∗0 = x,
(2.17)
and applying Itoˆ’s formula to (2.16), we obtain
dyt =
[
φ˙t +
(
P˙ 1t + P
1
t A˜t
)
x∗t +
(
P˙ 2t + P
2
t A˜t
)
(x∗t − Ex
∗
t ) + P
1
t B˜
1
t ϕ
∗
t + P
1
t B˜
2
tw
∗
t
]
dt
+
[
(P 1t + P
2
t )C˜tx
∗
t + (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
1
tϕ
∗
t + (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
tw
∗
t
]
dWt
=−
[
A˜⊤t P
1
t x
∗
t + A˜
⊤
t P
2
t (x
∗
t − Ex
∗
t ) + A˜
⊤
t φt + C˜
⊤
t zt + (S
2
t )
⊤w∗t +Q
2
tx
∗
t
]
dt+ ztdWt.
(2.18)
Thus
zt = (P
1
t + P
2
t )C˜tx
∗
t + (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
1
tϕ
∗
t + (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
tw
∗
t , t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.19)
Plugging (2.16), (2.19) into (2.13), and supposing that
(A2.4) R˜2t := R˜
2
t (Pt, P
1
t , P
2
t ) := R
2
t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t is convertible, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
we get
w∗t = −(R˜
2
t )
−1
{[
(B˜2t )
⊤P 1t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )C˜t + S
2
t
]
Ex∗t
+ (D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
tϕ
∗
t + Γ
⊤
t Ept + (B˜
2
t )
⊤φt
}
.
(2.20)
Inserting (2.20) into (2.19), we have
zt = (P
1
t + P
2
t )C˜tx
∗
t − (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1
[
(B˜2t )
⊤P 1t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )C˜t + S
2
t
]
Ex∗t
+
[
(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t − (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t
]
ϕ∗t
− (P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1Γ⊤t Ept − (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤φt.
(2.21)
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Comparing dt terms in the fourth equation in (2.15) and (2.18) and substituting (2.20), (2.21)
into them, we obtain
0 = P˙ 1t + P
1
t A˜t + A˜
⊤
t P
1
t + C˜
⊤
t (P
1
t + P
2
t )C˜t −
[
P 1t B˜
2
t + C˜
⊤
t (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t + (S
2
t )
⊤
]
× (R˜2t )
−1
[
(B˜2t )
⊤P 1t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )C˜t + S
2
t
]
+Q2t , P
1
T = G
2,
0 = P˙ 2t + P
2
t A˜t + A˜
⊤
t P
2
t +
[
P 1t B˜
2
t + C˜
⊤
t (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t + (S
2
t )
⊤
]
× (R˜2t )
−1
[
(B˜2t )
⊤P 1t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )C˜t + S
2
t
]
, P 2T = 0,
(2.22)
and
0 = φ˙t +
{
A˜⊤t −
[
P 1t B˜
2
t + C˜
⊤
t (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t + (S
2
t )
⊤
]
(R˜2t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤
}
φt +
{
P 1t B˜
1
t
+ C˜⊤t (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t −
[
P 1t B˜
2
t + C˜
⊤
t (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t + (S
2
t )
⊤
]
(R˜2t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤
× (P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t
}
ϕ∗t −
[
P 1t B˜
2
t + C˜
⊤
t (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t + (S
2
t )
⊤
]
(R˜2t )
−1Γ⊤t Ept,
φT = 0.
(2.23)
Note that system (2.22) consists two coupled Riccati equations, which is entirely new and
its solvability is interesting. In fact, adding the two equations in (2.22), it is obviously that
P 1 + P 2 ∈ Rn×n uniquely satisfies the ODE
0 = P˙t + PtA˜t + A˜
⊤
t Pt + C˜
⊤
t PtC˜t +Q
2
t , PT = G
2. (2.24)
Thus (2.22) becomes
0 = P˙ 1t + P
1
t A˜t + A˜
⊤
t P
1
t + C˜
⊤
t PtC˜t −
[
P 1t B˜
2
t + C˜
⊤
t PtD˜
2
t + (S
2
t )
⊤
]
× (R2t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤PtD˜
2
t )
−1
[
(B˜2t )
⊤P 1t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤PtC˜t + S
2
t
]
+Q2t , P
1
T = G
2,
0 = P˙ 2t + P
2
t A˜t + A˜
⊤
t P
2
t +
[
P 1t B˜
2
t + C˜
⊤
t PtD˜
2
t + (S
2
t )
⊤
]
× (R2t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤PtD˜
2
t )
−1
[
(B˜2t )
⊤P 1t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤PtC˜t + S
2
t
]
, P 2T = 0,
(2.25)
and it is a decoupled one now. Let
Q˜2t := Q
2
t + C˜
⊤
t PtC˜t, S˜
2
t := S
2
t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤PtC˜t, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Then the Riccati equation of P 1 can be written as{
0 = P˙ 1t + P
1
t A˜t + A˜
⊤
t P
1
t −
[
P 1t B˜
2
t + (S˜
2
t )
⊤
]
(R˜2t )
−1
[
(B˜2t )
⊤P 1t + S˜
2
t
]
+ Q˜2t ,
P 1T = G
2,
(2.26)
If we assume that
(A2.5) Q˜2 − S˜2(R˜2)−1(S˜2)⊤ > 0,
by (A2.3), (A2.4) and (A2.5), there is a unique solution P 1 > 0. Then there also exists a
unique solution P 2 = P − P 1 ∈ Rn×n.
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We discuss the solvability of equation (2.23) for the function φ. In fact, with some com-
putation, we can obtain a two-point boundary value problem for coupled linear ODE for
(Ex∗,Ep, ϕ∗, φ):
dEx∗t
dt
=
[
A˜t − B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1S
2
t
]
Ex∗t − B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1Γ⊤t Ept − B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤φt +B
2
tϕ
∗
t ,
dEpt
dt
=
(
A˜⊤t − Γ
⊤
t
)
Ept + (B
1
t )
⊤
Ex∗t + (B
2
t )
⊤φt +D
1
tϕ
∗
t ,
dϕ∗t
dt
=
(
Γt − A˜
⊤
t
)
ϕ∗t + Γt(R˜
2
t )
−1Γ⊤t Ept + Γt(R˜
2
t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤φt + Γt(R˜
2
t )
−1S
2
tEx
∗
t ,
dφt
dt
= −
[
A˜⊤t − (S
2
t )
⊤(R˜2t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤
]
φt −B
1
tϕ
∗
t + (S
2
t )
⊤(R˜2t )
−1Γ⊤t Ept, t ∈ [0, T ],
Ex∗0 = x, Ep0 = 0, ϕT = 0, φT = 0,
(2.27)
where for simplicity, we denote
S
2
t := (B˜
2
t )
⊤P 1t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )C˜t + S
2
t ,
Γt := Γt(R˜
2
t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t ,
B
1
t := P
1
t B˜
1
t + C˜
⊤
t (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t − (S
2
t )
⊤(R˜2t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t ,
B
2
t := B˜
1
t − B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t ,
D
1
t := (D˜
1
t )
⊤
[
(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t − (P
1
t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t
]
.
We define
X :=
(
Ex∗
Ep
)
, Y :=
(
ϕ∗
φ
)
,
At :=
(
A˜t − B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1S
2
t −B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1Γ⊤t
(B
1
t )
⊤ A˜⊤t − Γ
⊤
t
)
, Bt :=
(
B
2
t −B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤
D
1
t (B
2
t )
⊤
)
,
Ât :=
(
Γt(R˜
2
t )
−1S
2
t Γt(R˜
2
t )
−1Γ⊤t
0 (S
2
t )
⊤(R˜2t )
−1Γ⊤t
)
, B̂t :=
(
Γt − A˜
⊤
t Γt(R˜
2
t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤
−B
1
t −A˜
⊤
t + (S
2
t )
⊤(R˜2t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤
)
,
and denote
At :=
(
At Bt
Ât B̂t
)
,
thus (2.27) can be written as
d
(
Xt
Yt
)
= At
(
Xt
Yt
)
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
X0 = (x
⊤ 0)⊤, YT = (0 0)
⊤.
(2.28)
From the theory by Yong [15], we know that (2.28) admits a unique solution (X,Y ) ∈ L2(0, T ;R2n)
× L2(0, T ;R2n) if and only if
det
{
(0 I)eAtt
(
0
I
)}
> 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.29)
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In this case, (2.27) admits a unique solution (Ex∗,Ep, ϕ∗, φ) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn) × L2(0, T ;Rn) ×
L2(0, T ;Rn) × L2(0, T ;Rn). Some recent progress for the two-point boundary value problems
associated with ODEs, refer to Liu and Wu [6].
We summarize the above process in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3 Let (A2.1)∼(A2.5) and (2.29) hold, (P 1, P 2) satisfy (2.22), and (Ex∗,Ep, ϕ∗, φ)
satisfy (2.27). Then w∗ given by (2.20) is the state feedback representation of the unique optimal
control of the leader. Let x∗ satisfy
dx∗t =
{
A˜tx
∗
t − B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1S
2
tEx
∗
t − B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1Γ⊤t Ept
+
[
B˜1t − B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t
]
ϕ∗t − B˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤φt
}
dt
+
{
C˜tx
∗
t − D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1S
2
tEx
∗
t − D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1Γ⊤t Ept
+
[
D˜1t − D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t
]
ϕ∗t − D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤φt
}
dWt,
x∗0 = x,
(2.30)
p satisfy
dpt =
{
A˜⊤t pt − (D˜
1
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1Γ⊤t Ept
+
[
(B˜1t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t ) + (D˜
1
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )C˜t
]
x∗t
−
[
(B˜1t )
⊤P 2t + (D˜
1
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1S
2
t
]
Ex∗t
+
[
(D˜1t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t − (D˜
1
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t
]
ϕ∗t
+
[
B˜1t − (D˜
1
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤
]
φt
}
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
p0 = 0,
(2.31)
and define y∗ and z∗ in (2.16) and (2.21), respectively, then (x∗, y, z, p, ϕ) is the solution to the
system of MF-FBSDEs (2.15).
Finally, from (2.7) and (2.20), we obtain
u∗t = −(R˜
1
t )
−1
[
(B1t )
⊤Pt + (D
1
t )
⊤PtCt + S
1
t
]
x∗t
+ (R˜1t )
−1(D1t )
⊤PtD
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1
[
(B˜2t )
⊤P 1t + (D˜
2
t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )C˜t + S
2
t
]
Ex∗t
+ (R˜1t )
−1
[
(D1t )
⊤PtD
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(D˜2t )
⊤(P 1t + P
2
t )D˜
1
t − (B
1
t )
⊤
]
ϕ∗t
+ (R˜1t )
−1(D1t )
⊤PtD
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1Γ⊤t Ept + (R˜
1
t )
−1(D1t )
⊤PtD
2
t (R˜
2
t )
−1(B˜2t )
⊤φt, t ∈ [0, T ],
(2.32)
where x∗ is given by the MF-SDE (2.30). Up to now, we obtain the state feedback representation
for the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium solution (u∗, w∗).
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3 Concluding Remarks
To conclude this paper, let us give some remarks. In this paper, we have considered a new
kind of LQ Stackelberg differential game with mixed deterministic and stochastic controls. The
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium solution is represented as a feedback form of state variable
and its expectation, via solutions to some new Riccati equations. Though the framework is a
special case of Yong [16], some new ideas and interesting phenomena come out. We point out
that is is possible for us to relax the assumptions in Section 2 of this paper. Possible extension of
the results to those in an infinite time horizon with constant coefficients, is an interesting topic.
In this case, some stabilizability problems need to be investigated first, and differential Riccati
equations will become algebraic Riccati equations. The practical applications of the theoretic
results to Stackelberg’s type financial market is another challenging problem. We will consider
these problems in the near future.
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